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NOTES
APPLICABILITY OF USURY LAWS TO CREDIT
INSTALLMENT SALES
INTRODUCTION
During the past fifty years the economy of the United
States has become geared to and based upon the mass produc-
tion of consumer goods. An integral part of this new system
of economy is the installment credit system of financing re-
tail sales. In the early stages of development of this consum-
er credit system, there were many who doubted whether such
widespread credit extension would lead to a healthy econo-
my. Arguments based on these doubts have become largely
academic, however, for installment credit is now em-
bedded too deeply in the American economy to be extract-
ed without, at the same time, dealing a serious blow to the
economy as a whole. In 1948, total installment consumer
credit was in excess of eight billion dollars.1
There remains, however, the question whether the retail in-
stallment credit system is being properly regulated and po-
liced in order to adaquately protect the public. During the
earlier stages of development of this system, there were some
practices initiated which were certainly not to the best in-
terest of the public. Foremost among these was the charg-
ing of excessive "finance charges". The fact that many fields
of installment credit are free from serious abuses of this
nature today does not alleviate the problem of finding a
method of regulation of the credit system as a whole in order
to eliminate the remaining evils.
It is readily understandable that a retailer cannot sell as
cheaply on a credit basis as he can for cash. The amount of
increase in price between a cash and a credit sale is, how-
ever, a subject of the greatest public concern. There certain-
ly would be few consumers who would deny the need for some
limit to be placed upon the amount charged as a "finance
charge" or "time differential", but the real controversy arises
over whether the limitation should be imposed through the
application of usury laws to sales transactions.
1. 35 Fed. Reserve Bulletin 300 (March 1949).
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HISTORICAL PROCEDURES
In Biblical times, usury embraced any transaction in which
interest was charged, whether the interest was taken in
money or in kind; as such, usury was the subject of the
severest public condemnation. 2 The earliest statutes on the
subject in England included a prohibition of interest tak-
ing of substantially the same effect as the Biblical laws.3 Due
to the difficulty of enforcement during the early-part of the
industrial revolution, these statutes were repealed and re-
placed by statutes allowing a limited amount of interest to
be taken. These replacement statutes purported to fix the
maximum rate of interest allowable "on a loan or forbear-
ance of money". 4 The applicability of these statutes to a sales
transaction remained unsettled, despite an indication by dic-
tum to the affirmative in the case of Dewer v. Span,5 until
the precedent-setting case of Beete v. Bidgood,6 decided in
1821. The case arose as a consequence of the sale of real es-
tate. It appeared from the accounts in evidence that the pur-
chase price was £25,000, of which £9,000 was paid cash. To
the balance, £16,000, was added £4,800, leaving £20,800 to be
paid in installments. The defendant vendee gave notes for each
of the installments and the plaintiff sought recovery in this
action on one of these notes which was due and unpaid. The
defendant entered a plea of usury, contending that the £4,800
added to the credited balance was in the nature of interest
at an illegal rate. The Court, without citing authority, held
that the transaction in question was a bona fide credit sale,
with the credit price being higher by £4,800 than the cash
price; since the transaction in substance appeared to be a
sale, and not a "loan or forbearance of money", the statute
was inapplicable.
INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN COURTS
Although Beete v. Bidgood has not been specifically cited
in a large number of American cases, its influence is ob-
2. "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money,
usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon usury." Deuter-
onomy 23:19.
3. 13 Eliz. c 18 § IX (1570).
4. 12 Anne c 16 (1714).
5. 3 Term Rep. 425 (Eng. 1789).
6. 7 Barn & Cr2ss. 435, 1 Man. & Ry. 143, 108 Eng. Reprint 792
(1821).
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vious to this day. Two theories derived therefrom and often
applied today are, first, that the "time differential" is a part
of the credit price7 and secondly, that a bona fide sale does
not come within the meaning of the term "loan or forbear-
ance of money". Further, following the pattern set in Beete
v. Bidgood, there is a noticeable tendency of the courts -to
refrain from setting and following any clearly definable rules,
but rather to decide each case on its factual merits, with the
obvious result that the decisions in a given jurisdiction are
often difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. In this regard,
it is often stated by the courts that they will look beyond
the form and into the substance of the transaction to deter-
mine whether usury is present.9 Unfortunately, the courts
seldom make clear the test which they use to determine
whether the "substance" to which they look is usurious.
Another factor that influences both our present and past
decisions, and undoubtedly present in Beete v. Bidgood, is
the judicial abhorrence of forfeitures. Usury statutes are al-
most invariably armed with the teeth of forfeiture, the earli-
er and more harsh often providing for forfeiture of principal,
and the later providing for forfeiture of interest or multiples
thereof. 10 Throughout the decisions, therefore, there is a no-
ticeable reluctance to find usury present in a given transac-
tion. At times this reluctance is openly discussed by the
court,1' but more often it is evident from the strained reason-
ing of the opinion.12
The early cases in this country in which the law was de-
veloped on the point under discussion were concerned pri-
marily with the sale of realty, 13 as was Beete v. Bidgood."
Gradually, the cases presented have increasingly raised the
7. Richardson v. C.I.T., 60 Ga. App. 780, 5 S.E. 2d 250 (1939); Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Shelton, 139 Miss. 132, 104 So. 75 (1925); Yea-
ger v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss. 247, 32 So. 2d 548 (1947).
8. Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwarter, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39
(1936); Underwriters Acceptance Corp. v. Dunkin, 152 Neb. 550, 41
N. W. 2d 885 (1950).
9. Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp., 266 Minn. 550, 289 N. W.
411 (1939); 27 R.C.L. 211, Usury § 12.
10. ALA. CODE, tit. 9, § 65 (1940); Amiz. CODE., tit. 36, § 104 (1939)
MINN. STAT., § 334 (1941); GEN. STAT. OF N. C., tit. 24, § 2 (1943};
S. C. CODE, § 6740 (1942); VA. CODE, tit. 6, § 350 (1950).
11. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403, (1927);
Yeager v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss. 747, 32 So. 2d 548 (1947).
12. Munson v. White, 309 Ky. 295, 217 S. W. 2d 641 (1949).
13. Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U. S. 115 (1861); Van Shaick v. Edwards,
2 Johns 335 (N. Y. 1801); Dry Dock Bank v. American Insurance Co.,
3 N. Y. 344 (1850).
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issue in connection with the sale of personal property, the
transition paralleling the growth of the value and importance
of personal property in our economic system.
In considering the early cases, it is important to keep in
mind the basic transaction to which the courts have to apply
most frequently the law developed earlier. Greatly simplified,
the usual situation is this: In a purported sale on credit, the
"finance charge", or "time differential" between the cash and
the credit prices, if considered as interest on the cash price,
or possibly on the credited part of the price, as principal, is
in excess of the highest legal rate of interest.
There is one principle laid down by our early decisions
over which there seems to be no dispute, for it was early set-
tled that a vendee could fix one price for a cash sale and a
higher price for a credit sale. The United States Supreme
Court expressed this principle as follows:
But it is manifest that if A propose to sell to B a tract
of land for $10,000 in cash, or for $20,000 payable in
ten annual installments, and if B prefers to pay the larg-
er sum to gain time, the contract cannot be called usuri-
ous. A vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the
sum in expectancy, and a purchaser may prefer the
greater price with the longer credit; and one who will
not distinguish between things that differ, may say, with
apparent truth, that B pays a hundred per cent for for-
bearance, and may assert that such a contract is usuri-
ous; but whatever truth there may be in the premises,
the conclusion is manifestly erroneous. Such a contract
has none of the characteristics of usury; it is not for
the loan of money, or. for the forbearance of a debt. 4
LOAN OR FORBEARANCE
Usury statutes of the several states vary in form, but a
large majority are worded to regulate loans and forbearances
of money and things. Many courts hold that a sale does not
come within the terms of the statute and that therefore, there
can be no usury in a sale.15 In some of these jurisdictions,
14. Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U. S. at 116 (1861).
15. G.M.A.C. v. Swain, 176 So. 636 (La. 1937); Archer Motor Co.
v. Relin, 255 App. Div. 333, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (1938); Hendrix v. Harry's
Cadillac Co., 220 N. C. 84, 16 S. E. 2d 456 (1941).
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the courts seem to rely almost solely on this strict and literal
interpretation of the terms "loan" and "forbearance" to
reach their decisions. 'The case of Hatfer v. Spaeth"6 illus-
trates the application of this reasoning. The transaction be-
fore the court was evidenced by a conditional sale contract
specifying that the purchase price for the goods sold be paid.
in monthly installments of five dollars each "with $3.50 han-
dling charges per month or fraction thereof." The Court as
serted initially that the usury statute was applicable only
if there was a loan-or forbearance, for which terms it.gave
the following much used definitions:
The word "loan" imports an advancement of money or
other personal property to a person, under contract or
stipulation, express or implied, whereby the person to
whom the advancement is made binds himself to repay
it at some future time, together with such other sum as
may be agreed upon for the use of the money or thing
advanced.17
The term "forbearance" * * * signifies a contractual ob-
ligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a giv-
en period of time, from requiring the borrower or debt-
or to pay a loan or debt then due and payable.'8
The court then held that "manifestly" the transaction in ques-
tion did not come within the definitions given.
Although there are few courts that do not at least pay
lip service to the theory that there can be no usury in a bona
fide sale, all of the courts recognize that the form of a sale
may be used as a cloak behind which to hide a usurious loan.
Since the courts profess to look at the substance of the trans-
action and not the form, the courts leave the way open to
find the presence of usury in any form of contract where
the court decides the facts so warrant. It is not surprising,
however, that the coarts seldom find usury lurking behind
the cloak of a sale. Occasionally the veil by the form of a
sale is so transparent that even the most reluctant of courts
cannot fail to detect usury. Such was the case of Seebold v.
Ehitermann,19 in which the defendant vendor testified: "I
16. 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P. 2d 408 (1945).
17. 156 P. 2d at 412.
18. Id. at 411.
19. 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W. 2d 739 (1944).
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quoted him the price * * * * * * and that the interest for 12
months was $142.16. That (with the cost of insurance) made
up the total that went into the contract."20 As the Court ad-
mitted, in view of this candid admission, they could hardly
avoid finding that the sum of $142.16 was added for inter-
est and for no other purpose.
The technical distinction made by the courts between a "loan
or forbearance" on the one hand, and a retail credit install-
ment sale on the other, lacks the support of reason when
used for the purpose of determining whether usury is pres-
ent in a given contract. If A, a salaried worker without re-
serve capital, needs a car to perform his work, he may have
two alternatives. He may borrow money from a bank or pri-
vate lender, and thereby be enabled to buy a car for cash, in
which case he must give the lender a mortgage on the car
(and perhaps other security) ; or secondly, he may purchase
the car on credit under a conditional sale contract or a simi-
lar instrument. In either case a down payment is necessary.
In the first alternative, A must pay interest to the lender;
in the second, he must pay a "finance charge" to the dealer
(which actually accrues to a finance company who furnishes
the capital). In either case there is an added cost to A be-
cause he does not have the accrued capital to pay cash. Yet
under the technical distinctions drawn by the courts, the
lender would be limited in the amount of interest charged
by the usury statute, but the "finance charge" would not be
limited.
These distinctions, and the results reached thereby, are
often justified, although seldom in the decisions, by point-
ing up the difference in the amount of security required for
a loan from a bank or private investor and that required by
the finance company which accepts the contract of sale from
the dealer. It is undoubtedly true that a finance company
takes less security than many lending institutions would re-
quire. This fact would justify an argument that interest rates
should be adjusted by law to the security taken, but fails as
a valid reason for limiting interest on a direct loan, and
exempting altogether the "finance charge" on a credit install-
ment sale.21
20. 13 N. W. 2d at 744.
21. See 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173 (1935), where this argument
is strongly advanced.
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FINANCE CHARGE AS A PART OF THE CREDIT PRICE
The courts of many jurisdictions, theorizing that a ven-
dor may charge one price for cash, and a higher credit price,
reach the conclusion that the "finance charge" or "time dif-
ferential" is an integral part of the credit price.22 Among the
jurisdictions reaching this conclusion, however, there is con-
flict as to the circumstances under which the "finance charge"
vill be considered a part of the credit price.
There is substantial authority holding that the "finance
charge" is a part of the credit price of the goods sold, even
if the finance charge is stated separately in the contract of
sale,23 provided, of course, the sale is bona fide. This rule
borders on the inflexible, as illustrated by the case of Mun-
son v. White.2 ' A finance charge was added to the maximum
price set by the Office of Price Administration. The Court
held the finance charge to be a part of the credit price never-
theless, reasoning that there could be no interest in a bona
fide sale. The Court held further that Congress, in establishing
the Office of Price Administration, could not have intended to
allow the fixing of credit prices, but only cash prices.
Texas courts have reached opposite results in quite simi-
lar factual situations, 25 by holding that the "finance charge"
is considered as interest if stated separately in the contract
of sale. The Texas view is well expressed by Justice Hughes
of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals:
We cannot agree with appellant that the finance charge
is a part of the credit price. It would be most unusual
for a cash sale contract to specify the credit price or
for a credit sale contract to specify the cash price. The
contract would be for one price or the other, unless the
buyer is given an option which is usually in the form
of a discount, if paid within a certain time. The contract
here specified but one sale price and whether it be a
22. Cases cited note 7, supra.
23. Harper v. Futrell, 204 Ark. 822, 164 S. W. 2d 995 (1942); Fail-
ing v. National Bond & Investment Corp., 258 App. Div. 778, 14 N. Y. S.
2d 1011 (1938); Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Co., 206 Minn. 550,
296 N. W. 911 (1939).
24. 309 Ky. 295, 217 S. W. 2d 641 (1949).
25. Associates Investment Co. v. Thomas, (Tex. Civ. App.), 210 S. W.
2d 413 (1948); Associates Investment Co. v. Hill, (Tex. Civ. App.),
221 S. W. 2d 365 (1949); Gifford v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.), 229 S. W.
2d. 949 (1950).
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cash or credit price is not material. The amount of the
down payment is plainly stated and so is the amount of
the unpaid purchase price. That the $197.50 was not a
part of the purchase price is obvious unless we ignore
the contract which states that this amount was for the
"total finance charge and insurance premium for which
credit is extended." Omitting insurance, this language
is a fair definition of interest.26
Texas courts have held further that the failure to pay the
state sales tax on the finance charge indicated that such
finance charge was interest and not a part of the credit price.27
In determining whether the finance charge is a part of
the credit price, a distinction based solely on the manner of
stating the finance charge in the contract does not seem well
founded. This belies the unanimous rule that the court will
look to the substance rather than the form of the contract.
In addition, it discourages the practice of itemizing the ac-
count, which should be encouraged in order for the purchas-
er to be able to fully understand the premium he pays for
buying on credit, whether this premium be called "finance
charge" or "interest".
However, a rigid application of the rule that the finance
charge is always a part of the credit price provided the sale
is bona fide can be just as onerous, as illustrated by the re-
sult reached in Munson v. White.28 Where the price charged
prior to the addition of the finance charge is the maximum
allowed by the Office of Price Administration (or today by
the Office of Price Stabilization), or where the state sales tax
is paid on an amount exclusive of the finance charge, better
reasoning indicates that these are matters of substance
showing the finance charge is not a part of the purchase
price.
There is an additional factor bearing on the substance of
the transaction, which, judging from the expressed reason-
ing of the courts, is seldom given the weight it deserves, if
indeed it is given any weight at all. The fact that a retail-
er negotiates the sales contract immediately subsequent to
the sale to a finance company, coupled with the use by the re-
26. Associates Investment Co. v. Ligon, (Tex. Civ. App.), 209 S. W.
2d 218, 219 (1948).
27. Gifford v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.), 229 S. W. 2d 949 (1950).
28. Note 24, supra.
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tailer of forms and schedules of rates furnished by the finance
company, is a strong indication that the transaction is
in fact and substance a loan by the finance company to the
purchaser, made in the form of a sale by the retailer to avoid
the limitation of the usury statutes.
"RECENT TRENDS OF DECISIONS
The courts generally have shown no tendency to increase
the applicability of usury statutes to installment sales or to
adapt them by judicial interpretation to meet the contingen-
cies of changing economic conditions. There are some no-
table attempts, however, by the lower appellate courts of New
York to make broad application of the usury statutes to con-
ditional sales transactions.25 Since the Court of Appeals of
New York does not share their views, these cases are no-
table chiefly for their reasoning:
May the vendor make legal the unconscionable charge
of $130 for deferring the payment of $530 of the cash
purchase price for one year by smoothly sugar coating
it with phraseology? A sale on credit incurs risk, of
course. Likewise, there is risk in every loan, yet the law
allows but 6 percent, secured or unsecured. Here is the
security of the thing purchased, protected by insurance
against collision, fire, and theft. Perhaps the security will
have to be realized on, may be urged. True, but the con-
tract provides in that event for a 15 per cent attorney
fee. If the dealer may not legally charge $130 interest on
a $530 note secured by a chattel mortgage, why should he
be allowed to charge the same sum for the forbearance of
$530 of the cash purchase price secured by a conditional
contract of sale, under the guise of calling it a "differen-
tial"? Does calling it a "differential" instead of interest
save it from illegality? May interest masquerade as a
"differential" and so escape the penalty? May a fancy
name cloak an offense beyond recognition? "The shifts
and devices of usurers to evade the statute against usury
have taken every shape and form that the wit of man
could .levise, but none have been allowed to prevail".
29. Universal Credit Co. v. Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 743
(1938); Failing v. National Bond & Investment Corp., 168 Misc. 617,
6 N. Y. S. 2d 67 (1938), rev'd 14 N. Y. S. 2d 1011 (1938).
298
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Quackenbos v. Sayer (1875), 62 N. Y. 344, 346. It is for
the court to scrutinize the transaction, discover the real
facts and the actual intent and then apply the law ... 3
And in a later decision by the same court, we find:
If it is the needy individual whose protection the usu-
ry laws are enacted to guard, is the need of him who
borrows that he may buy for cash greater. than he who
purchases for credit? Where lies the difference . .
Tweedledum and Tweedledee have no place in the law to-
day, which professes to seek the truth; whose aim is
justice.3
1
Although these decisions did not meet with the higher court's
approval, the practical reasoning advanced seems unanswer-
able by logic. The fact that decisions based. on such practical
reasoning are in a small minority is a questionable tribute to
the judicial reluctance to change in order to keep step with
progress.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Until recent times, usury statutes of the several states con-
formed largely to the pattern set by the early English stat-
utes. Variances were mostly limited to degrees of forfeiture
and amounts of interest allowable. Today, however, some of
the more progressive states in this field have sought to
meet the current problems with legislation designed specifi-
cally to remedy the existing evils. The scope of this article
will not permit any exhaustive treatment of the many stat-
utes of the several states, but different types of legislation
will be briefly considered.
The most comprehensive effort to regulate the retail in-
stallment sale is probably embodied in the Utah statute en-
acted in 1935:
No contract for the purchase of any goods, wares or
merchandise or loan or forbearance of money, shall con-
tain any provision providing for a handling or service
charge on any said contract, or any commercial charge
on said contract, or any charge whatsoever, which when
30. Universal Credit Co. v. Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 2 N. Y. S. 2d at
750 (1938).
31. Failing v. National Bond & Investment Corp., 168 Misc. 617, 6
N. Y. S. 2d at 71, 72 (1938).
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taken together with the interest charged on such con-
tract for the sale of goods, wares or merchandise, or for
loan or forbearance of money, exceeds ten per cent per
annum of the unpaid principal sum of said loan or con-
tract, except; (a) a contract may specifically provide for
a service charge, which charge shall not exceed four per
cent per annum of the unpaid balance of the said princi-
pal sum, such service charge to be applied but once on
any transaction and shall not be again applied in case
of refunding or renewal of the contract between the
parties concerned with the original transaction; nor
shall such service charge be subject to any additional
service charge, interest charge or penalty; (b) a rea-
sonable attorney's fee in case of collection by attorney;
and (c) such exceptions as are otherwise provided by
law.32
Despite the comprehensive language of such statutes as
quoted above, there remains a wide latitude of effectiveness
to be determined by judicial interpretation. Consider a North
Dakota statute construed in Sayler v. Brady.83 The statute,
as amended, read in part:
... provided, further, that any evasion of this act by
charging more for goods or chattels when sold on credit
or on deferred payments, or when sold on monthly or in-
stallment payments, shall be deemed usury whenever
the total payments shall exceed the cash selling price,
plus eight per cent interest ... 34
The Court, in construing this statute, (and we quote from
the Court's syllabus) held:
(a) That the statute as amended is not a price fixing
statute.
(b) That sales of personal property on credit or on
deferred payments, or upon monthly or installment pay-
ments, are not prohibited by this statute, though the
total payments exceed the cash selling price, plus 8 per
32. Utah Rev. Stat. § 44-0-1, § 44-0-2, as amended by Utah Laws
1935, e 42.
33. 63 N. D. 47l1, 248 N. W. 673 (1933).
34. N. D. House Bill No. 93, 1933 Legislative Assembly.
300
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cent interest, unless made in order to evade the prohibi-
tion against usury as defined in it.
This well illustrates the profound effect which judicial in-
terpretation can have on comprehensive, clear and unambigu-
ous statutes. As was said in a partial dissent to the majority
opinion: "It may well be doubted whether the construction
(of the amendment quoted) adhered to by the majority of
the court adds anything to the statute."35
There are some statutes which seek not only to regulate
the amount of the charges made, but to further remedy the
evil by revealing to the purchaser the exact composition of
the total charge. The California Conditional Sales Law36 is
very comprehensive in this respect. This Act requires a re-
cital in the contract of the cash sale price; buyer's down pay-
ment, and whether made in cash or by trade in; cost to the
buyer of insurance; itemization of fees to be paid by seller
or buyer to any public officer; amount of the unpaid balance;
time price differential; contract balance; and number, amount
and due date of installments. Omission of these items makes
the contract unenforceable except by a holder in due course
for value.37 Further, this act provides maximums for the
various charges. It is to be noted that the charges permitted
are somewhat higher than the average maximum interest
limitations.
Although they may not accomplish all that could be de-
sired in this field, these progressive legislative acts are cer-
tainly strides in the right direction. It is evident, however,
that the courts are reluctant to strictly enforce a broadly
worded statute which purports to set maximum differences
between cash and credit prices on an indiscriminate basis. 8
In order to increase the probability of enforcement, legisla-
tures should make the statute detailed and as unambiguous
as possible. Also a statute regulating finance charges should
be based to some extent on the type of security taken by the
seller. Requirements for itemization of all charges, prices
and expenses incident to the sale undoubtedly serve their in-
35. 63 N. D. 471, 248 N. W. 673, 676 (1933).
36. CALIFORNTA CIVIL CODE, §§ 2981, 2982.
37. Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P. 2d 758
(1949).
38. Saylor v. Brady, 63 N. D. 471, 248 N. W. 673 (1983).
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tended function well, especially where combined with a limi-
tation of charges.
SOUTH CAROLINA VIEWS
The problems of usury in a credit sale seems to have been
first considered in South Carolina- in the case of Coleman v.
Garlington.a9 The transaction over which this action arose was
a sale by one partner to another of the seller's interest in a
mill owned by the partnership. To determine the selling
price, the parties added-ten per cent to the value of the stock
and seven per cent to borrowed money. The purchaser gave
five promissory notes in payment, totaling an amount reached
by the above described process, with each note bearing inter-
est at ten per cent. The Court, citing Beete v. Bidgood,40
held that the adding of ten per cent to the value of the stock,
and seven per cent to borrowed money, was a legal method of
arriving at a credit price; but the ten per cent charged on
the notes was interest and constituted usury.
In reaching this decision, the Court subscribed to the view
that there may be both a cash and a credit price for property;
and an adoption of the latter will not make the contract usur-
ious although the credit price is made up by the cash price
plus interest higher than the legal rate fixed by statute. The
court reasoned further, however, that once the purchase price
is reached, interest above the legal rate reserved upon this
purchase price will constitute usury although such interest
is provided for in the contract of sale.
The problem arose again a few years later in the case of
Thompson v. Nesbit,41 an action brought on a note executed
and delivered by defendant in payment for a slave purchased
from plaintiff. The testimony indicated that the purchase
price for the slave was $1,000. The body of the note read as
follows:
Three years after date, I promise to pay H. Thomp-
son, or bearer, thirteen hundred dollars, to be paid at
such times as I please, and to deduct ten per cent per
annum off the amount paid at each payment.4la
39. 2 Speers 238 (S. C. 1843).
40. Note 6, supra.
41. 2 Rich. 73 (S. C. 1845).
41a. ibid.
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The Court stated that it would look not at the form of the
transaction, but at the substance, and in this instance the
form of a sale was but a veil behind which there was an
attempt to hide usury. The Court also held that once the con-
tract had been determined, the question of the existence of
usury was one of law.
Some forty-five years later, the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court in the unreported case of
Wheeler v. Marchbanks.42 The facts of the case, as found by
the Circuit Court, were as follows: Mrs. Marchbanks de-
sired to purchase a tract of 72 acres, but was unable to meet
the- seller's price of $1,045, payable one-third cash, one-third
in one year, and the balance in two years. Mrs. Marchbanks
applied to plaintiff, Wheeler, for assistance, and Wheeler pur-
chased the property for $1,045 cash. Then Wheeler sold the
property to Mrs. Marchbanks for $400 cash, and notes for
$906 to be paid over a period of six years, for a total price
of $1,306. The defendant, Mrs. Marchbanks, pleaded usury
to an action on the note. The judgment, as affirmed, held that
there was no usury in the sale, but a just profit of $251 on a
sale in consideration for indulgence.
Peoples Bank v. Jackson4 followed shortly thereafter, in
which usury was raised as a defense to an action on a note
given by the defendant to the plaintiff in payment for land
purchased. The note bore interest at a greater rate than al-
lowed by statute, and the Court found the note to be usurious,
basing the judgment on the earlier case of Thompson v. Nes-
bit.44 It is interesting to note that Mr. Chief Justice McIver,
in a concurring opinion, points out that the citation of Beete
v. Bidgood45 in the case of Coleman v. Garlington46 for the
principle that the usury law did not apply to a contract to se-
cure the payment of the purchase money of property sold was
in his opinion dictum and further was controlled by the late
case of Thompson v. Nesbit.4
7
The question next arose in the case of Milford v. Milford,48
in which it was sought to foreclose a mortgage given to secure
42. 32 S. C. 594, 10 S. E. 1011 (1890).
43. 43 S. C. 86, 20 S. E. 786 (1895).
44. Note 41, supra.
45. Note 6, supra.
46. Note 39, supra.
47. Note 41, supra.
48. 67 S. C. 553, 46 S. E. 479 (1903).
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payment of six promissory notes executed and delivered by
defendant to plaintiff on the purchase price of land. Each
note reserved interest at ten per cent, and the mortgage was
for the amount equaling the principal and interest in the
notes. The plaintiff contended that the amount recited in the
mortgage was in fact the purchaseprice, but the Court point-
ed to the consideration stated in the deed, which was the
amount of the principal of the notes, and held the. notes to
be usurious without citing authorities.
In Osborn v. Fuller,49 a plaintiff sought to recover double
the amount of alleged usurious interest collected from plain-
tiff by defendant. Defendant, plaintiff's landlord, made ad-
vances to plaintiff by giving him written and verbal orders
on merchants for goods. Defendant paid the merchants, and
then charged and collected from plaintiff the amount he had
paid the merchants plus twenty per cent. The Court did not
hesitate to affirm a judgment for the plaintiff and a finding
that the form of a sale in this instance was but a cloak be-
hind which to hide a usurious loan.
A purported sale of wages, by an instrument assigning
$16.50 worth of wages to be earned for a consideration of
$15, was held to be a loan and usurious, despite the fact that
the instrument was entitled "Bill of Sale" in Martin v. Pacific
Mills.50
A situation very similar to that raised in Wheeler v.
Marchbanks5' was presented by Cohen v. Williams. 2 An ac-
tion was brought by Cohen to foreclose a mortgage, in which
the defendant Williams raised the defense of usury. When
certain lands were advertised for sale by a Master and Pro-
bate Judge, defendant Williams expressed to Cohen his de-
sire to own the lands advertised for sale. Cohen told Williams
that he, Cohen, might buy the land for speculation. Cohen bid
in the land at the auction, but had the deeds made to Wil-
liams as grantee. After Williams had executed the mortgage
and bond in suit, Cohen delivered the deeds to Williams. The
price Cohen charged Williams was $300 above the auction
price paid by Cohen, and eight per cent interest was reserved
on the bond. The Court relied strongly on Wheeler v. March-
49. 92 S. C. 338, 75 S. E. 557 (1912).
50. 160 S. C. 458, 158 S. E. 831 (1931).
51. Note 42, supra.
52. 164 S. C. 499, 162 S. E. 758 (1932).
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banks53 in holding the transaction to be a sale at a profit
without usury.
From this line of decisions there can be drawn certain prin-
ciples to which the Supreme Court of South Carolina has
uniformly adhered. The Court throughout the years has
recognized that a seller could charge a higher price for a
credit sale than for a cash sale and no usury would be pres-
ent although the difference in prices, if considered as interest
on the cash price, would be above the lawful rate. But the
Court subscribed just as strongly to the idea that charges
for forbearance for the part of the purchase price for which
credit was extended would constitute usury of higher than
the legal rate. This principle was asserted first in Coleman
v. Garlington54 and followed invariably through Milford v.
Milford." It will be noticed from a careful scrutiny of the
cases that where an increment was added to and based on
the part of the purchase price for which credit was extended,
such increment has been held to constitute usury if higher
than the legal interest rate.
The recent case of Brown v. Crandall56 presented to the
South Carolina Supreme Court for the first time a "time
price differential" as such. An action of claim and delivery
was brought to recover property covered by a chattel mort-
gage given by defendant to plaintiff to secure payment of a
purchase money note. The defendant interposed a defense of
usurious interest in the form of a "time price differential".
The case was submitted on the following agreed statement
of facts:
On or about April 16th, the defendant contracted the
plaintiff in regard to the purchase of a sawmill and other
incidental items named in the original claim and delivery
papers, and in the complaint. The plaintiff gave the de-
fendant a cash price of $1,875.00 including delivery
charges, and advised the defendant that if he wanted to
buy the sawmill on a time basis, that there would be a
time price differential of $120.00. The defendant paid
$675.00 down and gave the plaintiff a note and chattel
mortgage on the sawmill and incidental equipment for
53. Note 42, supra.
54. Note 39, supra.
55. Note 48, supra.
56. 218 S. C. 124, 61 S. E. 2d 761 (1950).
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1951], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
$1,320.00 which covered the remaining $1,200.00 of the
original cash price plus $120.00 as time price differential.
This total was to be paid in 12 installments of $110.00
each with interest at 7% after maturity.
5 7
The bill of sale for the credit purchase was as follows:
Brown Equipment and Supply Co
Walhalla, S. C.
April 16th, 1948
Sold to Prof. W. G. Crandall
Clemson, S. C.
1 Turner Ball and Roller bgr. saw mill $1,825.00
Delivery ------------------------ 50.00
$1,875.00
Less cash ----------------------- 675.00
$1,200.00
Time price differential ------------- 120.00
$1,320.00
Note due May 16th ------------- $1,320.00
Payable $110.00 on the 16th day of May, 1948,
and $110.00 on the 16th day of each and every
month until paid.58
The trial court found a bona fide sale at a credit price of
$1995.00, and that the note for the unpaid portion was not
usurious. This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Thus the South Carolina Supreme Court in effect turned
decidedly in the direction of the pattern set by the more con-
servative jurisdictions. Prior to this decision, the way was
open and the foundation laid by previous decisions for the
courts of this State to curb the evils of the "finance charge"
system. Now the door is closed.
An examination of the agreed statement of facts will
show many features of the case that indicate that an op-
posite result might logically have been reached. First, there
57. Id. at 125, 126, 61 S. E. 2d at 762.
58. Id. at 125, 61 S. E. 2d at 762.
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is no mention in the agreed statement of facts of the sum of
$1995.00, either as credit price or otherwise. Nor does this
sum appear on the bill of sale, $1,875.00 being the only price
specified anywhere. In addition, there is no mention of a
credit price existing. Second, it is obvious from the bill of
sale that the down payment was based on the first item stat-
ed in that bill of sale. The third, and probably the strongest
indication, is the fact that the time price differential is a flat
ten per cent of the amount for which credit or forbearance
was extended, as a look at the bill of sale will show. This is
not to suggest that the form of the transaction should be re-
lied on in lieu of the substance, but the facts shown by the
form should'not be ignored where, as in this instance, there
is nothing in the substance of the transaction to contradict
the terms shown by the form.
It is true that there is no ground for an assertion that the
result reached in Brown v. Crandall is -in conflict with any
case previously decided on the subject in this State. Neither
did the Court in that case purport to lay down any new hard
and fast rule that would bind them to such a result in the
future. Nevertheless, the result reached on this agreed state-
ment of facts, which are unequivocal, will bind the court in
the future to an identical result where "time price differ-
entials" are concerned; for the finance companies and retail
installment sellers have an approved pattern to which they
can conform without variation, and within which they may
frame their charges to their heart's desire.
SOUTH CAROLINA USURY STATUTES
South Carolina statutory provisions generally applicable
to the question under discussion are found in Sections 6738
and 6740 of the Code of Laws (S. C. 1942). Section 6738
provides for the maximum rate of interest to be charged ...
"for the hiring, lending or use of money or other commodity,
either by way of straight interest, discount or otherwise...
Section 6740 is what is commonly referred to as the "penal-
ty" section of the statute, and it provides for forfeiture of
double the usurious interest paid by the usurer.
There are many arguments to be advanced to the effect
that the courts could adapt the existing statutes to the fac-
tual situations in such a manner as to remedy many of the
18
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evils inherent in the finance charges; but since the courts
have indicated their intention not to do so, such arguments
are now academic. Therefore, it remains for the Legislature
to pass such laws as are necessary to remedy the situation.
By using the experiences of other states in applying their
more progressive usury laws as a guide, one may recognize
certain features which should be considered in designing new
legislation in this field.
Forfeiture provisions, embodied in a statute, tend to de-
crease the likelihood of strict application of the statute by
the courts, due to the judicial abhorrence of forfeitures. For-
feitures should therefore be kept to a minimum, that is con-
fined to forfeiture of the interest alone and not multiples
thereof.
Another feature found to be effective when incorporated
in modern usury statutes is that of compulsory itemization
of all charges included in a credit sale. This feature is
utilized to full advantage in the California Conditional Sales
Law. 9 The instances of usury will be much fewer where the
public is made aware of the cost of credit when the purchase
is made on the installment plan.
Probably the most progressive and effective step would be
the fixing of legal rates of interest or finance charges, and
basing the limitation, at least to some extent, on the amount
of security taken by the seller. This, in itself, would nullify
the most substantial argument for not applying the existing
statutes to credit sales transactions.
Both the California Conditional Sales Law 6 and the Utah
usury statute6' are excellent examples of practical, progres-
sive legislation in this field, and would serve as the best
existing guide to the legislatures of this and other states
where the need for new laws in this field is acute.
JOSEPH F. BUZHARDT, JR.
59. Note 36, 8upra.
60. Note 36, supra.
61. Note 32, supra.
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